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Economic Integration in East Africa:
Distribution of Gains
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
I. THE NEED FOR CONTROLS
A. BENEFITS OF UNIFICATION
Although both integration proposals and attempts to implement
them have been frequent throughout the last decade, there are few if
any successfully functioning economic unions among developing
states.' The manifest disparity between effort and consequence does
not appear to be adequately explained by disillusionment on the part
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B., Pitts-
burgh, 1960, LL.B., 1963, Ph.D., 1967; LL.M., Harvard, 1965. Professors Det-
lev F. Vagts of the Harvard Law School and Marina von Neumann Whitman
of the University of Pittsburgh have been of great help to me in the prepara-
tion of this paper. Errors are my own.
1. The two traditional forms of economic integration, the customs union and
the free-trade area, have been defined in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of
a single customs territory for two or more customs territories,
so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (ex-
cept, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI,
XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to
substantially all the trade between the constituent terri-
tories of the union or at least with respect to substantially
all the trade in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce are supplied
by each of the members of the union to the trade of terri-
tories not included in the union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restric-
tive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those per-
mitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are elimi-
nated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, para.
8, 62 Stat. 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 1765, 62 U.N.T.S. 56. The term "common
market" normally denotes a customs union within which "not only trade
restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished." B.
BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961). "An economic
union . . . combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and fac-
tor movements with some degree of harmonization of economic policies."
Id. Although more limited economic cooperation among states has been
called "integration," this word is generally employed only to designate
groupings of at least the free trade level. These terms, together with such
non-technical labels as "amalgamation," "consolidation," and "combina-
tion," are frequently used indiscriminately where precise delimitation of
the characteristics of the arrangement is not required.
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of national leaders concerning the magnitude of potential gain to par-
ticipants as a group.
Conventional customs union theory, best characterized as an ex-
pansion of the static neo-classical international trade framework to
embrace discriminatory restraints, indeed offers little justification for
combination: "If we apply [traditional] analysis to underdeveloped
countries, it looks as though we should have to conclude that these
countries should avoid economic unions like the plague." 2 But class-
ical arguments are largely irrelevant in a dynamic context:
As regards underdeveloped countries . . . the conventional
theory simply misses the basic point. Being designed to ex-
plore the problem of optimal allocation of given resources,
under given conditions of production, within a competitive
framework, it cannot illuminate situations, such as those
which arise in underdeveloped countries, in which neither
resources nor conditions of production can be taken as given,
and in which immobility of factors of production obstructs
the operation of market forces. For any underdeveloped
country contemplating closer economic ties with its neigh-
bours the primary question is not-will this enable us to use
our present resources more efficiently? . . . The primary
question for any potential grouping of underdeveloped coun-
tries is whether discriminatory encouragement of trade with
one another would tend to accelerate the rate of growth or
not.3
Proponents have asserted: "A customs union of underdeveloped
countries . . . has a greater number of strictly economic arguments
in its favor than does its counterpart among industrial countries." 4
Prospective gain is primarily attributable to the possibility of ex-
ploiting economies of scale in manufacturing. The problem of inade-
quate internal markets currently confronts almost all developing
states: among them, gross national product exceeds seven billion
dollars only in India, Brazil, Mlexico and Pakistan.5 Over ninety of
the underdeveloped nations have populations below fifteen million;
2. S. DELL, A LATIN AiaEmcAN CoMMoN MARxEr? 15 (1966). "An extremely
low level of economic development will tend to keep economic benefits at a
minimum.... The higher the stage of economic development, the greater
is the potential economic gain." Allen, Integration in Leso Developed Areas,
14 KYKL0s 315, 319, 329 (1961).
3. S. DELL, supra note 2, at 16-17. "The traditional theory of customs unions
will . . . be of little usefulness for evaluating the desirability and the pos-
sible consequences of integration in less developed areas." B. BALASSA, ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 35 (1965).
4. Linder, Customs Unions and Economic Development, in LATIN ARaICAN
EcoNoMic INTEGRATION 32, 41 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966). "It is certain that
without integration there will be no economic development in Latin Amer-
ica." Herrera, The Financing of Latin American Integration, INT'L DEVEL-
OPMENT REV., Sept. 1963, at 7.
5. B. BALfASSA, EcoNobnc DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 80 (1965).
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more than sixty have fewer than five million people.6 Efficient in-
dustrialization, rightly or wrongly the objective of most national
leaders,7 can generally be achieved only through economic consolida-
tion. Autarkic policies normally either preclude substantial manufac-
turing activity or require sacrifice of income through reliance on ex-
pensive low-volume production techniques."
B. INTRAMARKET IMBALANCE
Although economic union may facilitate development of the inte-
grated region as an entity, an individual state must still weigh the
advisability of joining a prospective combination or of continuing
participation in a functioning amalgamation. Union will most likely
be viewed by 211 member nations as profitable only if gains are so
distributed that the position of each is superior to that probable in
isolation. Institutional structures promoting relative distributional
equality, politically undesirable because they may restrict national
autonomy or add a burden of continuing negotiation, are necessary to
the extent that unimpeded market forces fail adequately to allocate
the rewards of combination.
The possibility of exploitation of the less industrialized, inherent
in economic integration among nations at different stages of devel-
opment, may be simply demonstrated. Sheltered from competition
from excluded countries by tariff barriers, a state previously capable
of exporting only raw materials may find intraunion markets for its.
high-cost finished goods. Partners may be forced to surrender both
customs revenue derived from duties on manufactures and exclusive
control over import policies with little possibility of gain: elimina-
tion of impediments to trade with other member nations will prove
valueless if newly opened markets experience a continuing surplus
of primary products. Disadvantaged states will find foreign exchange
earned by extraunion sales expended on association output; favored
partners will supplement income from traditional sources with earn-
ings from protected export of manufactured goods. As a result, "the
less favored regions can be said to be financing the industrial de-
velopment of their more advanced counterparts by paying higher
than world-market prices for industrial products in intra-area
trade." 9
6. S. DELL, supra note 2, at v.
7. "What alchemy was to the Middle Ages, industrialization is to the under-
developed world of this century-the magic elixir that can transform feudal
societies." P. NEHEMKIS, LATIN AMERICA: MYTH AND REALITY 185 (1964).
8. See Birmingham, Integration and Economic Development, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
781.
9. B. BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 124 (1965).
If we assume that the non-industrial territories pay prices for manu-
factures of their partners which are equal to the prices of competing
imports, including import duty, then by being in the union they lose
revenue equal to the duty on the manufactures which they buy from
their union partners instead of from the outside world. Probably this
410
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Frequently characteristics of a common market area will permit
accurate prediction of regional growth patterns in the absence of
government intervention. Nevertheless the development process itself
can contribute additional pressures toward imbalance. Consider a
uniformly undeveloped plain. By hypothesis industrial enterprise may
locate at any point with equal advantage. Its very establishment,
however, differentiates its site from the remaining territory: erection
of other manufacturing facilities requires choice by the decision maker
between contiguous and relatively distant plots. Such possible benefits
as "the availability of economic overhead facilities (transportation,
gas, electricity, water supply, waste disposal, etc.), the availability
of a skilled labor force, ease of exchange of technical information,
and the existence of linked processes (vertical and horizontal special-
ization, auxiliary services, etc.)" 10 weight selection probabilities
heavily in favor of the agglomerative alternative. In addition, in back-
ward areas payments to workers by previously established enterprises
may provide a spatial demand differential allowing freight expense
minimization through juxtaposition." In industrializing areas, there-
fore, "a relatively small amount of development can create economies
for an area which may not only stimulate further development there,
but may permanently retard development elsewhere." 12 Wionczek
concludes: "To leave the allocation of production factors exclusively
to the free interplay of market forces would be equivalent to concen-
trating development in the more advanced countries among the union
membership." 13
loss of revenue brings about a reduction of public expenditure, lead-
ing to a reduction of total income. Correspondingly, of course, the in-
dustrialised territory gains in total income, because of the existence
of its secondary industry. The taxation on this income will compen-
sate its government (indeed, probably more than compensate it) for
what it loses in import duty by producing manufactures at home in-
stead of importing them.
Brown, The Benefits of Regional Economic Integration Among African
Countries, 2 DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DIG. 17, 81 (1963).
10. B. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 195 (1961).
11. "The very market-oriented nature of much modern production tends to lead
to large industrial centres becoming even larger as market expansion feeds
on itself to create more market expansion." Bird, The Need for Regional
Policy in a Common Market, 12 SCOT. J. PoL ECON. 225, 232 (1965).
12. Kennedy, The East African Customs Union: Sonic Features of Its History
and Operation, AlAKERERE J., No. 9, 1959, at 19, 26. "As soon as industry
and trade become more concentrated in a particular centre, they them-
selves give to that centre an advantage for further development." J. HICKS,
ESSAYS IN WORLD ECONOMICS 163 (1959). "The attractions of the estab-
lished centre are a commonplace of industrial location theory. In the ab-
sence of deliberate governmental measures, the freer and less costly the
trade between a backward and an advanced area, the stronger is the ad-
vantage of the advanced area for further development. The more open it
is to the products of the advanced area, the less chance is there of compet-
ing industries developing in the backward area." A. HAZLEWOOD & P. HEN-
DERSON, NYASALAND: THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERATION 63 (1960).
13. Wionezek, Introduction: Requisites for Viable Integration, in LATIN AmEn-
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Even after integration, internal demand generated within pro-
tected market areas will normally prove insufficient to permit compe-
tition among manufacturing facilities of optimum size over the en-
tire spectrum of manufacturing activity.14 Given a tendency toward
plant agglomeration, it is likely that unregulated development will
be characterized by heavy concentration of monopolistic enterprise
within one or a small group of member states. The ability of uncon-
trolled new firms to exploit consumers throughout the union will be
limited only by the elasticity of demand curves and the height of
-tariffs providing shelter from external supply sources: lagging part-
ner nations may be forced to import high cost manufactures at prices
further inflated by producer gains made possible by noncompetitive
markets. Thus "[r] egional problems are prominent among the reasons
why a simple customs union is unlikely to be enough to satisfy even
the simplest aims of establishing it." 15
C. EAST AFRICA
Economic association has been maintained among Kenya, Tan-
-zania, 16 and Uganda for almost half a century. These three contiguous
former British dependencies, roughly comparable in economic magni-
-tude,17 are thus our most important source of information concerning
ICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 3, 9 (M. Wioriczek ed. 1966). "The State ...
cannot stand still and allow economic forces free play, because this can
only mean an aggravation of the problem and the most unfavored regions
tend to be pushed further into the background in this way." S. BARZANTI,
THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET 332 (1965).
"Free trade tends to bring about unequal rates of development in what-
ever area or region it applies. And just as, in the past, worldwide free
trade led to great and growing inequality between continents, so now
would intra-regional free trade be likely to lead to, or intensify, correspond-
ing inequality between countries." S. DELL, supra. note 2, at 146.
14. "The real choice of alternatives that an economic union in Latin America,
Asia, or Africa must make, insofar as concerns the industrial activities
representing the motive force behind development, lies between spontaneous
monopolies and oligopolies, on the one hand, and monopolies controlled by
union authorities, on the other." Wionczek, supra note 13, at 10.
15. Bird, Regional Policies in a Common Market, in 1 FISCAL HARMONIZATION
IN COMMON MARKETS 385, 403 (C. Shoup ed. 1967).
16. Tanzania was formed in 1964 through union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
See United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Articles of Union, April
22, 1964, 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 768 (1964); Zanzibar Union of Zanzi-
bar and Tanganyika Law, April 25, 1964, 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 763
(1964); Tanganyika and Zanzibar Transitional Provisions Decree, 3
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 770 (1964) (effective April 26, 1964); Tanganyika
and Zanzibar Interim Constitutional Decree, 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 772
(1964) (effective April 26, 1964). Zanzibar is only now being brought fully
into the East African integration program. See Hazlewood, Appendix to
Chapter 3, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 394, 395 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967). The
name "Tanganyika" will be used where temporally appropriate.
:17. Although Uganda is less than half the size of Kenya and only a little more
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the impact of integration upon the development process. Since inten-
sive efforts to establish machinery which will redress interterritorial
inequalities have succeeded early laissez-faire attitudes, the East
African experience not only provides evidence of the need for inter-
vention but also illustrates use of a wide range of regulatory devices.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF COMBINATION
A. UNION ESTABLISHMENT AND STRUCTURE
In 1900 the first formal tariff arrangement of the landlocked British
Protectorate of Uganda was instituted in the form of a five per cent
ad valorem duty on all imports. Although goods destined for this ter-
ritory were permitted free passage through German East Africa,
later Tanganyika, an identical levy on products shipped via the port
of Mombasa in the British East Africa Protectorate, now Kenya, was
collected and retained by Kenyan authorities. Although Uganda per-
mitted these latter commodities untaxed entry into its territory, con-
sequent loss of customs revenue was at first of little significance: most
traffic traveled the German route, and Kenyan and Ugandan receipts
were both ultimately destined for British coffers.
Improving rail connections with the Kenyan port city of Mombasa
combined with doubling of the duty in 1904 to magnify the impact of
continuing revenue diversion. In 1909, when Kenya at last agreed to
transfer of transhipment taxes, annual Ugandan income from im-
port levies rose from 3285 to 23,875 pounds. Although Kenya's con-*
tribution was initially determined at the commencement of each fiscal
year, a payment of 25 per cent of receipts at Mombasa was soon nego-
tiated; in 1919 this proportion was increased to 33 per cent. Kenyan
and Ugandan customs authorities were amalgamated in 1917, when
annual collections by the latter had fallen to only a few hundred
pounds. The immediate effects of this de facto economic consolidation
were negligible: trade in locally produced commodities was virtually
nonexistent, and the external tariff served only to provide govern-
ment income. In 1921, however, Kenya gained complete control of
customs administration; at its insistence import burdens were again
doubled."'
Although Tanganyika retained administrative authority over her
customs system until 1949, British control of Tanganyika under a
League of Nations mandate following German expulsion at the con-
than a quarter the size of Tanzania, large portions of these latter states
are desert:
Kenya Tanganyika Uganda
Area (thousands of square miles) 225 362 93
Population (1965) (millions) 9.4 10.1 7.6
Gross Domestic Product (1964)
(millions of dollars) 778 684 482
W. HANCE, AFRIcAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 178, 186, 200 (rev. ed. 1967).
18. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 19.
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clusion of the First World War 9 permitted harmonization of East
African external tariffs and elimination of internal impediments to
trade in locally produced commodities. Although even apart from
balancing mechanisms minor deviations from the common market
ideal persist today,20 a customs union among Kenya, Tanganyika, and
Uganda was largely achieved by January 1, 1923.21 In 1927 agreement
was reached permitting free circulation of imported goods and credit
of impost receipts to the territory of ultimate consumption.
On the recommendation of a Kenya government committee, pro-
tective imposts designed to stimulate local production were levied:
Prior to 1922 import duties in Kenya, as in all three territo-
ries, were designed for revenue and without protective in-
tent. Certain export duties were levied for revenue without
regard to their restrictive effect on production. Development
of land was largely left to individual endeavor. In September
1922, on recommendation of the Bowring Committee, Kenya
definitely discarded the laissez-faire principle and delib-
erately adopted the policy of fostering suitable industries as
the foundation of her economic policy. Import duties were
readjusted with the avowed intention of inspiring and con-
solidating industries. . . .Export duties were abolished and
additional attention was paid to the policy of adjusting rail-
way rates from time to time so as to stimulate production
for export and widen the market for local produce. . . .The
proposal to introduce a development policy assisted by cus-
toms tariffs. . . originated in Kenya.22
Specific duties on commodities which subsequently suffered price de-
clines led to implicit ad valorem burdens as high as 70 per cent.
Kennedy asserts: "There can be no doubt that these duties did prove
to be highly successful in encouraging a number of Kenya's indus-
tries in a period when world economic conditions were far from con-
ducive to agricultural development." 23 Uganda's protests were vocif-
erous but largely unavailing. 24
19. T. FRANCK, EAST AFRICAN UNITY THROUGH LAW 14 (1964).
20. J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISMI AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION 284 n.23 (1965).
21. T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 21.
22. Excerpt from a 1929 Report of the Tariff Committee of the Government of
Kenya, quoted in Kennedy, supra note 12, at 27.
23. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 25-26.
24. Frequent protests have been made by public bodies since the present
duties were first introduced . . .and a definite move to bring about
the removal of the protective duties was made in 1927 by a resolution
passed in the Legislative council to the effect that such duties ought
to be abolished. Notice was eventually given to the Kenya Govern-
ment that unless early steps for their removal were taken by all
three territories this Government would introduce legislation for
their removal as far as Uganda was concerned. It is obvious that
the majority of the members of the Kenya Tariff Committee are not
prepared to agree to the removal of the protective duties. Uganda
...is not prepared to agree to their continuance.
Excerpt from a 1929 Report of the Customs Tariff and Railway Rate Com-
mittee of the Government of Uganda, quoted in id. at 28.
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Continuing economic association and the necessity of policy har-
monization during World War II led to close political ties. After the
war the British Colonial Office recommended creation of a Central
Legislative Assembly and a High Commission served by an elaborate
administrative network.25 As finally authorized, the High Commis-
sion was composed of the three territorial Governors and could act
only after unanimous agreement. The principal executive officers of
the new organization were an Administrator, a Commissioner for
Transport, a Postmaster General, a Legal Secretary, a Financial Sec-
retary, a Commissioner of Customs, and a Chief Administrative Sec-
retary. The Central Legislative Assembly, little more than an advisory
body, consisted of these seven officials, a Speaker and two Arab mem-
bers appointed by the Commission, five members appointed by each of
the Governors, and three members elected by each of the regional
legislatures. Commission authority was essentially restricted to the
administration of stated interterritorial undertakings, primarily in-
volving transportation, communication, and revenue collection.20 Sub-
ordinate bodies employed 21,000 persons and supplied about eight per
cent of the union's gross domestic product; 21 in 1960 the expenditures
of these bodies totaled 125 million dollars. Approximately 90 per cent
25. Inter-Territorial Organisation in East Africa (Colonial No. 191). See GL
BRIT. E. AFR. EcoNoMIc & FISCAL COMM'N, REPORT, CIND. No. 1279, at 2
(1961).
26. Jurisdiction was granted in the following areas:
(a) Transport and communications services, comprising:-
1. Railways, inland waterways and harbours together with asso-
ciated road services and coastwise shipping;
2. Posts and telecommunications;
3. Air transport; and
4. Civil aviation and meteorological services.
(b) Revenue collection, i.e.:-
5. Customs and excise collection; and
6. Income tax assessment and collection.
(c) Economic and statistical services, comprising:-
7. Department of Economic Co-ordination, and East African rep-
resentative overseas; and
8. Statistical services.
(d) Research services, comprising:-
9. Agricultural and fisheries research services;
10. Medical research services;
11. Industrial research services; and
12. Research by the Meteorological Department.
(e) Other specific services, comprising:-
13. East African Literature Bureau;
14. East African Hides and Leather Bureau;
15. Desert Locust Survey (including Control) ; and
16. Royal East African Navy.
(f) General administration, including the East African Office in Lon-
don and the Central Legislative Assembly.
GR. BRIT. E. AFR. ECONOMIC & FISCAL COMM'N, supra note 25, at 11. See
East Africa (High Commission) Order in Council, 1947, 1 STAT. R. & 0.
758 (No. 2863), Third Schedule.
27. J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATiON 133 (1965).
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of the total outlay was internally supplied by revenues of the large,
self-contained transportation and communication units; funds for
other operations were derived from territorial appropriations and
British grants.28
B. DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPMENT
The fact that the union has existed for more than forty years makes
it difficult to compare conditions in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda
with those which would have prevailed in the absence of combina-
tion.29 Although conclusive demonstration of loss to individual par-
ticipants is thus impossible, patterns of trade and growth in East
Africa are those predicted by the imbalance hypothesis. Kenya has
attracted the bulk of area industry: 404 of the 474 companies operat-
ing in East Africa in 1958 were located in this state.30 In 1964 manu-
facturing activity accounted for 9.6 per cent of Kenyan gross domes-
tic product; the industrial sector in each of the partner units contrib-
uted less than four per cent to smaller total outputs. Manufacturing
wages and salaries in Kenya in this year amounted to more than 34
million dollars, over three times those in either of the other states.3'
Protected by tariff barriers from external 'competition, Kenya is
able to sell manufactures to her neighbors at prices above world
market levels. Tanganyika and Uganda pay for their purchases
through export of raw materials to unassociated states; Kenyan im-
ports are primarily more sophisticated products supplied by advanced
nations. Kenya exports over 60 per cent and imports under 30 per
cent of all goods traded in East Africa.32 Between 1956 and 1962,
Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanganyikan interterritorial exports in-
creased 90, 60, and 10 per cent respectively. 3 The value of manufac-
28. GR. BRIT. E. AFR. ECONOMIC & FISCAL COMM'N, supra note 25, at 31.
29. In order to deduce statistically the beneficial effects of the common
market it is necessary to show that, in its absence, the levels of inter-
territorial output, etc. would have been lower than, in fact, they have
been. This, of course, is an impossible task when a common market
has been in existence as long as that of East Africa. Once therefore,
the inherent unity of the market has been demonstrated the case for
its retention must rest solely on the advantages deduced by economic
theory.
Lomas, The Report of the East Africa Economic and Fiscal Commission,
8 E. AFR. ECON. REV. 14 (1961).
30. J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION 147 (1965).
31. W. HANCE, supra note 17, at 200.
32. P. NDEGWA, THE COMMON MARKET AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA 53,
Table IV.7 (1965). Trade patterns are illustrated by 1965 data:
Value (millions of dollars)
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Balance (external trade) -103.6 +39.2 +64.7
Balance (interterritorial trade) + 49.6 -30.2 -19.6
Net Balance - 54.0 + 9.0 +45.1
Hazlewood, Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION
AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION
69, 112 n.93 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967).
33. Due & Robson, Tax Harmonization in the East African Common Market, in
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tured products exported by Kenya to her neighbors more than doubled
between 1959 and 1963, increasing from 43.5 per cent to 57.9 per
cent of her total intramarket trade.3 4 Nearly three fourths of all man-
ufactures traded in 1963 were exported from Kenya. Tanganyika, by
contrast, exported 7.6 per cent and imported 44.6 per cent of such
goods.3 5
In 1962 over 46 per cent of intraunion exports of Tanganyika
could be imported from unassociated states without duty; yet 86.7
per cent of sales by her partners, four times as extensive, enjoyed
external tariff protection. Acquisition from extraunion sources of
goods purchased by Tanganyika from Kenya and Uganda would have
required payment of duties averaging almost 50 per cent of product
value, a tax rate nearly twice that safeguarding Tanganyikan inter-
territorial exports.3 6 Nominal levels of protection of course do not
precisely measure loss from association through purchase of the pro-
tected goods. Hazlewood has recently argued that "[a]n analysis of
the territorial impact of the tariff which takes account of the distinc-
tion between 'necessary' and 'excessive' protection leads to the con-
clusion that there is relatively little difference in the degree of pro-
tection afforded to the interterritorial trade of the three countries." sT
2 FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMiMON MWARKETS 553, 590 (C. Shoup ed.
1967).
34. P. NDEGWA, supra note 32, at 65, Table IV.12.
35. Country shares of trade in manufactured goods in 1963 have been com-
puted by Ndegwa:
Exports Imports
Value Percentage Value Percentage
(millions (millions
of dollars) of dollars)
Kenya 32.1 74.8 7.2 16.8
Uganda 7.6 17.6 16.5 38.6
Tanganyika 3.2 7.6 19.1 44.6
Adapted from id. at 72, Table IV.14.
36. Ghai, Territorial Distribution of Benefits and Costs of the East African
Common Market, 11 E. AFR. ECON. REV. 29, 36, Table II, 39, Table III
(1964), reprinted in FEDERATION IN EAST AFRICA---OPPRTUNITIES M
PROBLEMS 72, 77, Table II, 80, Table III (C. Leys & P. Robson eds. 1965).
37. Hazlewood, Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION
AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 69,
79 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967). The author supports his contention by replac-
ing nominal tariff rates with "effective" rates derived by eliminating from
calculations "milk, beer, cigarettes, and manufactures which are exported
outside East Africa at average values higher than those in interterritorial
trade":
Average Degree of Protection of Exports
(per cent)
Nominal Effective
Kenya to Uganda 36 19
Uganda to Kenya 41 9
Kenya to Tanganyika 45 12
Tanganyika to Kenya 16 11
Uganda to Tanganyika 68 19
Tanganyika to Uganda 13 10
Id. at 80 n.19.
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Nevertheless Ghai states: "A cursory comparison of the prices (ex-
cluding customs duty) of a few imported agricultural and manufac-
tured products with the prices of similar domestic products shows
that import duties are a reasonably good measure of the actual pro-
tection received by local products. This does not necessarily mean that
East African producers are inefficient; the price differential could
equally well be due to monopoly profits made by domestic produc-
ers." 31 Ndegwa concurs: "Domestic producers . . . can raise their
prices to the level of import prices. If there were sufficient competi-
tion among domestic producers, domestic prices might be forced down
to f.o.b. export prices; but there is not sufficient competition in East
Africa as yet, and it is therefore likely that domestic prices are
higher than need be. This means that all East African co nsumers are
'exploited.'" "3:1
Evidence concerning income levels in the partner states is conflict-
ing. Franck asserts that while in the interval between 1952 and 1954
per capita incomes were approximately equal in Kenya and Uganda
and about one third lower in Tanganyika, in 1959 Ugandan and
Tanganyikan incomes lagged behind the Kenya average by 45 and
90 per cent respectively. 40 Inequality may be less striking: 1961
Kenyan, Tanganyikan, and Ugandan per capita incomes of 72, 55, and
62 dollars have been derived from data provided by the East African
Statistical Department. 41 Hance uses estimates of gross domestic
product per capita in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda in 1964 of
85, 68, and 65 dollars respectively. 2
Observers have typically concluded:
The benefits accruing from the common market have not
been equally shared - Kenya has gained substantially,
Uganda has certainly gained although not by as much as
Kenya, while Tanganyika has probably lost and certainly
has gained the least. These unequal benefits derive from un-
equal growth rates in the manufacturing sectors of the
three countries, with the result that tensions and strains
have developed in the operation of the common market. It is
important to notice, however, that in the present conflict
among the three countries it is generally agreed that the
common market is effective in promoting development and
industrialisation; the conflict arises from unequal distribu-
tion of the benefits accruing from it.43
38. Ghai, Territorial Distribution of the Benefits and Costs of the East African
Common Market, in FEDERATION IN EAST AFRICA-OPPORTUNITIES AND PROB-
LEMS 72, 79 (C. Leys & P. Robson eds. 1965).
39. P. NDEGWA, supra note 32, at 107.
40. T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 67.
41. B. Massell, Economic Union in East Africa-An Evaluation of the Gains
12, 17 (Rand Corporation Paper P-2971, Sept. 1964).
42. W. HANCE, supra note 17, at 200. See J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST
AFRICAN INTEGRATION 72 (1965) ; Due & Robson, supra note 33, at 555.
43. P. NDEGWA, supra note 32, at 136.
Just as virtually all studies have agreed that the common market
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As early as 1932 Armitage-Smith argued that Tanganyika "should
cease to deplete her revenue and impoverish her citizens by protect-
ing the products of her neighbors." 44 Allegations that Tanganyika had
been reduced "to nothing more than the consuming market for Kenyan
industry" 45 were frequent:
"If this thing is manufactured in Kenya, we in Uganda or
we in Tanganyika do not have to import it from London
or France or Germany: we can get it from Kenya and we
shall therefore lose money because the import tax we would
have gained when it was imported from outside countries
will not now be charged." This is the sort of argument that
goes around when you have discussions about the economic
relationships of the territories. Instead of being glad that in
one part of East Africa you have a new industry manufac-
turing items that were being imported before, somebody
stands up and says: "No, if we keep on importing we get a
little more money for our government; we get a little more
revenue in terms of customs duty. When it is manufactured
in East Africa we do not get anything, and when we buy
has benefited East Africa as a whole, likewise they have agreed that
a disproportionate share of the benefits has accrued to Kenya, with
some doubt that Tanganyika has gained at all. Uganda has appar-
ently gained, but much less than Kenya .... With much of the new
industry concentrated in Kenya, persons in the other two countries
have been forced to pay higher prices for protected goods, while they
have benefited much less from industrial growth. From a fiscal stand-
point, the other two countries lose revenue from customs as protec-
tion becomes effective, yet they do not benefit to nearly the same ex-
tent as Kenya from additional income tax revenue from greater
economic activity. Were the other two countries not a part of the
common market, it is argued, they could provide 'protection for their
own industries, and while their consumers would pay higher prices,
the countries would enjoy the benefits of the industrial development.
From a strictly short-run standpoint, it is very likely that Tangan-
yika, in the past, would have been better off outside of the common
market.
Due & Robson, supra note 33, at 590, 591. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF
UGANDA 93 (1962); B. Massell, The Distribution of Gains in a Common
Market-The East African Case 13 (Rand Corporation Paper P-2956, Aug.
1964); Birch, Opportunities and Problents of Federation, in FEDERATION IN
EAST AFRiCA-OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS 6, 22 (C. Leys & P. Robson
eds. 1965); Ghai, Territorial Distribution of the Beefits and Costs of the
East African Common Market, in FEDERATION IN EAST AFRICA-OPPORTUNI-
TIES AND PROBLEMS 72, 81 (C. Leys & P. Robson eds. 1965); Hazlewood,
Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DISIN-
TEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 69, 79-81 (A.
Hazlewood ed. 1967).
44. ARrITAGE-SMITa, REPORT ON A FINANCIAL MISSION To TANGANYIKA, CMAD.
No. 4182, at 25 (1932).
45. Tanganyika Standard, April 14, 1947, at 3, quoted in T. FRANCK, supra note
19, at 50.
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from Kenya it is the Kenya Government that gets the income
tax on those profits." 46
IV. EARLY ADJUSTMENTS
A. PROMOTING IMBALANCE
Viner asserts:
The Tanganyika-Kenya Customs Union provides a striking
instance where a territory was brought into a customs union
by external authority in order to provide an expanded field
for the tariff protection of industries of another terri-
tory. . . The customs union operated to create a protected
market in Tanganyika for the produce of the small colony
of British planters in Kenya, for whose welfare the British
Government has shown a constant and marked solicitude.4 7
The institutions of East African unification were thus not created for
purposes of adjustment. 48 Due and Robson state:
The other countries have long complained that Kenya re-
ceives a disproportionate amount of the total tax rev-
enue. . . . In large measure the complaint is based on the
fact that the other two countries sacrifice customs revenue
when the duties become protective, while Kenya gains the
additional income tax from the industrial development. Sec-
ondly, the formula for allocation of profits of companies on
the basis of origin does not take into consideration sales
made by manufacturers in Kenya, having no separate estab-
lishment outside Kenya, directly to purchasers in the other
46. Kiano, The Emergent East African Federation, in FEDERALISM AND THE
NEw NATIONS OF AFRICA 39, 52 (D. Currie ed. 1964). "We do not appreciate
our people being exploited for the benefit of industries in Kenya." E. Afr.
Standard, May 18, 1960, quoted in J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRi-
CAN INTEGRATION 143 (1965).
47. J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 70-71 (1950).
48. "[A factor] which set the East African problem apart from comparable
problems in other federations was the absence of any system of equaliza-
tion to aid the less developed territories and compensate those which seem
to be deriving the least benefits from the association. In most federal sys-
tems the benefits of the association are shared not only according to the di-
rect contribution made but also according to need." T. FRANCK, supra note
19, at 67-68. Franck's implicit application of the term "federation" to the
East African union would appear inadvertent or at least devoid of in-
tended significance. A "federated state" has been described as "an inde-
pendent central organism, having its own machinery absorbing, in view of
international law, all the individual states associated together." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 740 (4th ed. 1951). This source further defines "federal"
as "a term commonly used to express a league or compact between two or
more states, to become united under one central government." Id. Since any
major act of the East African central authority required approval by the
chief executive of each of the constituent territories, its independent pow-
ers appear to have been minimal.
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two countries. The other countries have a legitimate claim
to a portion of the revenue, which they would get under
the Massachusetts formula widely used in the United States
for the allocation of income for state income tax purposes.
. . . Thirdly, since most of EACSQ headquarters operations
are carried on in Kenya, it is argued that Kenya receives
a disproportionate share of the income tax of EACSO em-
ployees. 49
Ugandan and Tanganyikan leaders have claimed that "Kenya
-dominated the common services and bent them to her own pur-
poses." 50 Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, was designated organization
headquarters, and the governor of this territory, appointed permanent
chairman, was authorized to act on behalf of the High Commission
when this body was not in session. A preponderance of the staff re-
main Kenyan. It has been argued that "the cross-subsidization in the
self-contained services must be a powerful counterweight to the un-
equal distribution of the gains from the common market." 51 Never-
theless, because the railroad system is best developed in Kenya, this
region receives a disproportionate share of total benefits. Until re-
cently East African Airways overseas flights terminated only in
Nairobi. In 1955 Kenyan communications accounted for almost 75
per cent of intraunion mail.
The vast majority of imports enter East Africa through the Kenyan
port of Mombasa. Although customs revenues are attributable to the
territory where the burdened goods are finally consumed, inadequate
recording of intraunion commodity movements has worked to the
disadvantage of Tanganyika and Uganda. The requirement that funds
raised by income taxation be paid to the territory in which the income
originated was construed by the Commission to allow excessive trans-
fer to Kenya of receipts generated by trade in internally produced
goods. During the fiscal year 1959-1960 this region received 40 per
cent of total union customs revenue and almost 60 per cent of income
and company tax proceeds.5" Unilateral actions by Kenya have rein-
forced the disequilibrating pressures: inequality has been intensified
by the practice of the Marketing Boards of this region of selling
domestically supplied beef, bacon and ham, butter, cheese, and ghee
in Tanganyika and Uganda at prices above those charged to unas-
sociated countries. -53
49. Due & Robson, supra note 33, at 596-97.
50. T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 63.
51. Hazlewood, Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFIiICAN INTEGRATION
AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN EcoNoMIc AND POLITICAL UNION 69,
85 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967). The author estimates that in 1963 rail, air,
and postal and telegraph operations yielded a joint surplus of 7 million
dollars in Kenya and Uganda and a loss of 6.7 million dollars in Tangan-
yika. Id. at 84.
52. T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 55-69; J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST
AFRICAN INTEGRATION 78, 163-67 (1965).
.53. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEELOPMENT, mpra note
43, at 87-88.
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B. INDUSTRIAL LICENSING
During the Second World War the governors of the three regions
agreed to establish an interterritorial administrative body "to decide
questions of policy relating to future industrial development . . .
with particular reference to the siting, financing, and selection of
types of industry required." 54 In 1948 the High Commission promul-
gated the East African Industrial Council Order,-- creating a succes-
sor institution in anticipation of the introduction of a system offering
guarantees of temporarily sheltered markets to new enterprises for
the purpose of increasing investment. Organization membership was
set at 12: the Administrator and the Economic Secretary of the High
Commission were designated Chairman and Deputy Chairman respec-
tively, the High Commission was given the right to choose one fur-
ther individual, and the governors of the territories were each autho-
rized to select three persons. Officials were to serve two-year terms
and could be reappointed. Council meetings were to be convened by
the Chairman at times and places of his choosing. Sessions once a
year were made mandatory; in addition, assembly was required with-
in one month of written request by at least six members. Seven suf-
ficed to establish a quorum; decision was uniformly through concur-
rence of a majority of those present and voting. The Order, de-
signed merely to establish an organizational framework, left the
scope of the agency's activities essentially to the discretion of other
bodies. Article 3, the sole provision delineating competence, autho-
rized unguided Council deliberation only in the exercise of its capac-
ity "to advise the High Commission on questions of policy re-
lating to industrial development." On the other hand, the new organ
was directed to consider and make recommendations concerning mat-
ters submitted by the High Commission or the territorial executives
and to undertake duties assigned by the High Commission or the ter-
ritorial legislatures. Although firms producing cotton yarn, cotton and
woolen blankets, and cotton and woolen piece goods other than knit-
wear were brought under Council control in 1948, the body remained
largely inactive during the succeeding five years.
In 1953 Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda adopted the East African
Industrial Licensing Ordinance,5 6 granting to the Council broad pow-
ers of regulation over production of specific commodities scheduled by
the territorial governors on Council recommendation and with the
consent of local legislative bodies. The manufacture of included items
without a license is prohibited. Although firms producing goods at
the date their supply is brought under administrative control receive
54. Preamble, East African Industrial Council Order, H.C.N. 31 of 1948, LAWS
OF THE HIGH COMM'N 521 (rev. ed. 1951).
55. H.C.N. 31 of 1948, LAWS OF THE HIGH COMM'N 521 (rev. ed. 1951).
56. 10 LAWS OF KENYA C. 496 (rev. ed. 1962); TANGANYIKA TERRITORY LAWS &
STAT. c. 324 (1956); UGANDA PROTECTORATE ORDERS & SUBSIDIARY LEG. 45
(1953).
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licenses almost automatically, entrepreneurs entering the field must
obtain Council approval of their proposed plants.
Provision is made for thorough investigation by the Council of each
application; publication requirements and hearing procedures afford
third parties ample opportunity to raise objections. Section 3 directs
that Council discretion to grant or deny licenses be exercised in the
light of:
(a) the capital, technical skill, and the raw materials
available to the applicant;
(b) the siting, or proposed siting, of any factory in relation
to the availability of power, fuel, labour, transport,
raw materials, land, and water;
(c) the potential production of, and the potential demand
for, both within and without the East African Ter-
ritories, the scheduled articles in respect of which
the application is made in so far as, in the opinion
of the Council, such production and demand is likely
to affect the undertaking in respect of which the ap-
plication is made;
(d) the interests and conditions of service of the labour
employed or to be employed by the applicant;
(e) the interests of the potential consumers of the scheduled
articles in respect of which the application is being
made;
(f) the general promotion and development of industries
and the avoidance of uneconomic competition.
Lack of concern for developing interterritorial industrialization dis-
parities is manifest: the criteria appear designed rather to encourage
agglomeration. Rejections of applications must state the rationale for
the action; licenses conferred may include restrictions on the activities
of the recipient. Failure to comply with the conditions imposed or to
maintain a minimum level of production of licensed articles permits
revocation of Council approval. Any applicant or licensee aggrieved
by a Council decision may contest it before the Industrial Licensing
Appeal Tribunal. The rulings of this body, composed of a legally
trained Chairman and six other persons, all appointed by and holding
office at the pleasure of the East African executive, are specifically
declared not subject to court scrutiny. The permissible scope of Tri-
bunal review is not defined.
Incentive to participate in the program is provided by section 17:
(1) Any applicant for a license or any licensee may apply
to the Council for a declaration that . . . no other
license to manufacture for sale any scheduled article,
or to erect, establish, and operate a factory for the
the license of the applicant shall be granted during
manufacture for sale of any such article, covered by
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such period not exceeding five years from the date of
such declaration as the Council may determine and
the Council may make such a declaration ...
(2) Any declaration . . .may, on the application of the li-
censee made either before or after the expiry of the
declaration or any renewal of it, be renewed by the
Council for a further period not exceeding five years
from the date of the expiry of the declaration or any
period for which it has been renewed.
The Council may issue licenses in disregard of its declaration onl.V
with the written consent of the entrepreneur to whom it was made.
Section 23 provides criminal sanctions for knowingly making false
statements in applications or at inquiries or for illicit manufacture
of scheduled products: fines imposed for a continuing offense may
exceed 500 dollars, and violators defaulting in payment are subject
to imprisonment for as long as one year. Where a corporation is con-
victed, every director is deemed individually guilty of a like trans-
gression unless lack of knowledge or absence of consent is affirma-
tively proved.
Initial enthusiasm for the program led to inclusion before the end
of 1955 of fabric made from materials other than cotton, wool, or
flax; steel drums; sheet glass and glass-ware; metal doors and metal
window and door frames; and enamel-coated metal hollow-ware. No
further extension of Council regulatory powers occurred until 1964.
In mid-1963 only 32 licenses were in force; the majority of these
covered textile production, for the most part brought under adminis-
trative control in 1948. Program development was blocked by the re-
fusal of Tanganyika and Uganda to consent to incorporation of new
categories; the absence of constraints on plant location designed to
insure equitable interterritorial distribution of new industry had
fostered agglomeration in Kenya, and continued participation by the
lagging union members could only result in restriction of oppor-
tunities to attract competing units. Dell states: "[T] he industrial li-
censing system rapidly became a means for preventing competition
with plants already established in Kenya. In other words, licensing
became a means of arresting development in Tanganyika and Uganda
rather than promoting it." 57
C. REFORM AND RETREAT
As the member regions of the common market approached in-
dependence,58 leaders realized that at least some movement toward
57. S. DELL, TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS 238 (1963).
58. Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya became states on December 9, 1961, Oc-
tober 9, 1962, and December 4, 1963, respectively. Tanganyika Independence
Act, 1961, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 1; Uganda (Independence) Order in Council,
[1962J 3 STAT. INSTR. 2745 (No. 2175); Kenya (Independence) Order in
Council, [19631 3 STAT. INSTR. 3846 (No. 1968).
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closer political combination and interterritorial equalization of amal-
gamation benefits was essential if economic union, expected ultimately
to induce federation, was to continue.59 In 1961 the Raisman Com-
mission, constituted by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies
in the preceding year, reported that joint institutions should be
strengthened and a portion of revenue receipts should be used par-
tially to redress spatial imbalance.0 Most of its recommendations
were incorporated into law by the East African Common Services
Organization Agreement between the new nation of Tanganyika and
Great Britain, acting on behalf of Kenya and Uganda, concluded on
December 9, 1961, and taking effect two days later."1
Through this compact, prior union institutions were replaced by
the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO), a similar
but politically somewhat more consequential native-controlled inter-
territorial structure. Power was centered in an Authority consisting
of the elected head of each of the partner states and acting only by
unanimous resolution. This body was assisted by satellite Communi-
cations, Finance, Industrial Coordination, and Social and Research
Committees and appointed the Secretary-General, the administrative
head of the Organization. The strengthened and reconstituted Central
Legislative Assembly comprised a Speaker appointed by the Author-
ity, the Secretary-General and the Legal Secretary of the Organiza-
tion, four members appointed by each of the regional executives, and
nine members elected by each of the regional legislatures. Organiza-
tion responsibilities were not significantly expanded beyond those en-
trusted to its predecessor.
The accord created a revenue pool composed of 40 per cent of re-
ceipts from the income tax on manufacturing and finance profits and
six per cent of proceeds from customs and excise levies after deduc-
tion of total joint tax collection costs: one half of the funds thus ac-
quired were spent by the Organization on non-self-contained services;
the remainder were distributed equally among the three regions. The
59. The task, then, was to devise an interim legal structure which would
see the territories through the transitional period between the time
the first and the last of them reached independence and a federation
could be negotiated. Such a structure would have to: harness the new
political consensus; make at least a respectable start toward remedy-
ing the growing problem of the aggregation of wealth by some equi-
table, if token, system of redistribution; bridge the constitutional gap
between independent and colonial territories; avoid the appearance of
colonially-inspired commitment to political integration; yet nudge
the territories toward that very objective.
T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 72-73. "Economic union can operate effec-
tively only if it is supported by political union." Statement by Tangan-
yikan Vice-President Kawawa, quoted in Nye, The Extent and Viability
of East African Co-operation, in FEDERATION iN EAST AFmrCA-OPPoRTUNI-
TIES AND PROBLEMS 41, 43 (C. Leys & P. Robson eds. 1965).
60. GR. BRIT. E. AFR. EcoNoMIc & FiscAL CoMM'N, supra note 25. at 2.
61. East African Common Services Organization Agreement, December 9, 1961.
437 U.N.T.S. 47.
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resulting transfers from Kenya to Tanganyika, Uganda, and the
common institutions during the 1962-1963 fiscal year were approxi-
mately 900,000 dollars, 800,000 dollars, and 400,000 dollars respec-
tively.62 Ghai nevertheless argues: "The operation of the distributable
pool has the effect of redistributing revenue from Kenya to Uganda
and Tanganyika. However, the increase in Tanganyika's revenue
brought about by the operation of the distributable pool does not ap-
pear to be an adequate compensation." 63
On June 5, 1963, the regime issued a joint declaration of intent to
seek political union:
We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East
Africa . . . pledge ourselves to the political federation of
East Africa. Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of
Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish regional inter-
ests. . . .We are convinced that the time has now come to
create . . . a central political authority. A working party is
being established which will prepare a framework of a draft
constitution for the Federation of East Africa. . . . In the
third week of August a full scale conference will be con-
vened to consider the proposals of the working party. The
three Governments have agreed to the establishment of a
Federation this year.6 4
The working party, which met four days later, was announced to
have "fully examined all points relating to the constitution and . . .
reached agreement on every issue." A draft constitution was or-
dered prepared for presentation at the end of the month. Debate
concerning the document, however, revealed differences among the
negotiating parties which have thus far prevented closer association.
Nye maintains: "The subjects of disagreement read almost like the
framework for the constitution that was supposed to have been agreed
upon: the number and powers of legislative chambers; citizenship;
division of power over foreign affairs; the civil service; the site of
the capital; mineral rights; agriculture; and residual powers." 60 In
62. P. NDFGWA, supra note 32, at 105.
63. Ghai, Territorial Distribution of the Benefits and Costs of the East Afri-
can Common Market, in FEDERATION IN EAST AFRICA-OPPORTUNITIES AND
PROBLEMS 72, 81 (C. Leys & P. Robson eds. 1965). "It may be concluded
that, although there is no unambiguous measure of the size of the redis-
tribution achieved by the Raisman arrangements, it cannot be thought that
they bring a large enough distribution to satisfy the benefiting countries,
even though they deprive the losing country of more revenue than it can
afford." Hazlewood, Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN IN-
TEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
UNION 69, 93 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967).
'64. Tanganyika Standard, June 7, 1963, at 3, quoted in T. FRANCK, supra note
19, at 156-58.
65. Tanganyika Standard, June 11, 1963, at 1, quoted in T. FRANCK, supra note
19, at 158.
66. J. NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION 186 (1965).
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August the Ugandan Minister of Broadcasting and Tourism stated
that his nation could not accept partial surrender of state powers
without "certain guarantees" and further time to consider "where
she is going." G' The working party was dissolved following a final
fruitless session on May 30, 1964.68
In 1960 Dr. Nyerere, now President of Tanzania, asserted: "You
must rule out the question of federation after we take our seats as
sovereign states in the United Nations." G9 Repudiation of a portion
of the prerogatives of independence, newly achieved after decades of
colonial subordination, would appear unlikely.7 O Unsettled economic
issues nevertheless could alone have prevented federation.
V. THE KAMPALA AGREEMENT
A. SCOPE
Recognition that continued economic association required more
equal distribution of benefits led to conclusion of the Kampala Agree-
ment, 71 signed on April 21, 1964, by representatives of Kenya, Tan-
ganyika, and Uganda, who met in Kampala, Uganda, as an Emergency
Committee authorized by the heads of their governments earlier in
the month in response to a Tanganyikan ultimatum. -- On January 14,
1965, the leaders of the three nations approved minor modifications in
compact provisions and decided to embody their understanding in a
formal legal convention. 73 Tanganyika had become Tanzania as a
consequence of union with Zanzibar, and this new designation was
employed in the revised Agreement. 7 4
The partner states hoped to supplement the fiscal redistribution
measures introduced by the East African Common Services Organiza-
tion Agreement of December 9, 1961,75 with direct controls over in-
dustrial location and interterritorial trade. In article 1 of the amended
document, five measures designed to alleviate imbalance within the
union were enumerated in order of diminishing feasibility of rapid
implementation:
(a) Immediate action with certain interterritorially con-
nected firms to increase production in a deficit coun-
try and thereby reduce imports from a surplus coun-
try.
67. Tanganvika Standard, Aug. 21, 1963, at 1, quoted in T. FRANCK, oupra note
19, at 160.
68. T. FRANCK, supra note 19, at 163.
69. Quoted in id. at 173.
70. See Leys, Recent Relations Between the States of East Africa, 20 INT'L J.
510 (1965).
71. Agreement of Ministers of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika on Redress-
ing Trade Imbalance, 3 INT'L LzoAL MATERALS 1106 (1964).
72. Leys, supra note 70, at 521.
73. The Kampala Agreement, E. AFR. J., April 1965, at 24.
74. See note 16 supra.
75. See § IV(C) supra.
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(b) Agreement as to the immediate allocation of certain
major industries.
(c) The application of a system of quotas and suspended
quotas whereby exports from surplus countries would
be progressively reduced, and local production in-
creased in the deficit countries according to the build-
ing up of the productive capacity of the deficit coun-
try.
(d) Increased sales from a country in deficit to a country in
surplus.
(e) Early agreement within the East African Common
Market on a system of inducements and allocations of
industry in order to secure the equitable distribution
of industrial development as between the three coun-
tries.
B. INTRAFIRM LOCATIONAL CHANGES
Application of section (a) of article 1 was discussed in article 2.
Its initial section listed the East African Tobacco Company, the Bata
Shoe Company, East African Breweries, and British Portland Ce-
ment (Bamburi) as firms with plants operating or under construction
in both Kenya and Tanzania. Succeeding portions dealt individually
with the prospects for output redistribution of each of these produc-
ers. The Ministers for Commerce and Industry of the territories of
factory location had interviewed officials of the first three firms; a
meeting with executives of the fourth was planned.
The tobacco concern had already sent some machinery to its es-
tablishment in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. Officers esti-
mated that production from this plant would by July 1964 be suffi-
cient to satisfy approximately 90 per cent of regional demand, the
remaining 10 per cent being for brands with union consumption in-
sufficient to warrant multiplant manufacture. Firm leaders agreed
that serious consideration would be given to the possibility of locat-
ing in Tanzania new facilities for the production of additional low
volume brands. The probably uneconomic alternative of transferring
a portion of current specialized output to the deficit nation was ig-
nored.
The Bata Company supplied about 70 per cent of the East African
footwear market through plants manufacturing narrow lines for in-
terterritorial distribution. Although Kenya purchased a considerable
quantity of Tanzania output, the latter territory incurred an annual
net trade deficit in the products of this industry of almost one mil-
lion dollars. Firm officials had indicated that output at Dar was be-
ing expanded: a new line with anticipated sales approaching 240,000
dollars per year was expected to be established by the end of 1964.
East African Breweries and its affiliates produced 81,000 cases of
beer per month, nearly 85 per cent of union output; the remaining
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production was divided among two Kenyan and two Tanzanian com-
petitors. At a cost approaching two million dollars, the corporation
had undertaken a program designed to render Tanzania almost self-
sufficient with respect to this commodity by late 1965. And although
Tanzania was without cement capacity, commencement of initial trials
of a plant under construction at Dar was expected by early 1966; the
EACSO Agreement expressed hope that officials would be persuaded
to advance the completion date into 1965.
In section (f) of article 2 the parties estimated that these changes
would "improve the balance in respect of tobacco by £700,000; for
footwear by £100,000, for beer by £500,000, and for cement by
£500,000, making a total of £1,800,000, or a net reduction of 24% of
the 1963 net trade imbalance" between Kenya and Tanzania. Doubt
concerning reliability of these figures is raised by the near impos-
sibility of improving the yearly footwear balance by 280,000 dollars
through increasing annual production in Tanzania by less than
240,000 dollars.
A similar program designed to benefit Uganda at the expense of
Kenya was more briefly described. A reduction in the Uganda ciga-
rette trade deficit, in excess of 900,000 dollars annually, was planned.
A proposed Bata Company plant at Kampala was expected to satisfy
60 per cent of the regional shoe demand, reducing purchases from
Kenya by more than 800,000 dollars per year. Application of the quota
systems described in article 4 and Appendix 1 to beer and cement
imports was calculated to yield gains of 250,000 and 420,000 dollars.
Section (h) of article 2 concluded: "The total effect in reducing im-"
balances between Uganda and Kenya of these changes might be of
the order of £650,000, which is equal to approximately 23% of the
overall imbalance."
Problems of trade between Tanzania and Uganda were dealt with
in section (i) : "As regards the favorable Uganda balance with Tan-
zania, the action taken with regard to cigarettes may have a reducing
effect of the order of £200,000. The total in respect of beer could be
reduced by £50,000, making an overall reduction for these two items
of £250,000, or 17% of the 1963 imbalance." No transfers between
Uganda and Tanzania were contemplated with respect to the cement
and footwear industries.
C. ALLOCATION OF INDUSTRY
Article 3 embodied a first attempt to use the long established in-
dustrial licensing mechanism to apportion new enterprises in a man-
ner promoting balanced interterritorial development. This article pro-
vided that certain goods not yet widely manufactured in East Africa
be scheduled for production regulation under the Ordinance of 1953.70
Temporarily exclusive supply rights with respect to each of the items
76. See "§ IV (B) supra.
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thus listed were to be allocated to an enterprise intending to establish
a plant within a specified member nation.
Production of tires and tubes would have been restricted to Tan-
zania under the Agreement. The radio industry was likewise to be
centered there, although the interests of existing firms in other re-
gions were to be protected if they purchased Tanzanian parts. Sole
authorization to assemble and manufacture Landrovers, and a mea-
sure of advantage and vaguely defined market protection with respect
to truck construction, initially assigned to Tanzania, were replaced in
the amended understanding by the exclusive right to produce plain
aluminum sheets, circles, and foil.77 Priority in the nitrogenous fertil-
izer and bicycle industries was allocated to Uganda; firms assembling
the latter product in Kenya or Tanzania at the time of the Agreement
were to be required to purchase parts other than tires and tubes from
sources within the preferred nation. Kenya acquired a monopoly in
the manufacture of incandescent light bulbs which could be expanded
to embrace neon and fluorescent tubes.
A justified word of caution concerning the uncertainty of gains
anticipated from the understandings enumerated was contained in
section (b) of article 3:
Although the effect of these allocations is expected to contrib-
ute towards a substantial improvement of the trading pat-
tern, it is impossible at this stage to estimate exactly the
size of this effect, because it is not possible to say when any
of these units will come into production, nor what will be the
trading pattern when they do come into production.
D. THE QUOTA SYSTEM
Article 4 and Appendix 1 provided further relief to retarded re-
gions by authorizing temporary imposition of quotas upon specific in-
traunion imports with regard to which the recipient deficit country
has productive capacity. Restrictions, effected through import or ex-
port license systems, could as a rule be instituted by a state when-
ever it experienced a negative total interterritorial trade balance of
at least 20 per cent of exports to other members. Where, as in the
cement industry, excess capacity was anticipated in two or all three
of the regions, however, import limitations imposed by a disadvan-
taged partner could be countered by defensive introduction of like
measures by others. Paragraph 3 of Appendix 1 directed that total
trade prohibited by a country in a given year should not exceed in
value its intraunion deficit during the preceding year "modified to
take into account the envisaged effect of the output of allocated in-
dustries, quotas and suspended quotas already granted, and of any
77. A proposal by a group of investors to establish an automobile assembly
plant in Kenya apparently caused this alteration. See Wionczek, Economic
Integration and Regional Distribution of Industrial Activities: A Compara-
tive Study (Part II: East Africa), 4 E. AFR. EcoN. Ruv. 31, 34 (1967).
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increase in net exports from the country in surplus to the country
in deficit in the previous year." The last of the adjustment criteria
would appear merely to have cautioned that trade trends and the
temporary nature of some balance disturbances should not be disre-
garded through mechanical application of the other standards of com-
putation. Quota application was explicitly limited to deficit product
categories; trade in output of industries allocated under article 3,
however, could not be restricted. Suggested quota duration was five
years.
Paragraph 6 of Appendix 1 asserted:
The size of the quota (allowed imports from the surplus
country in a particular product line) shall be calculated by
taking the amount of exports from the country in surplus to
the country in deficit, minus the exports from the country
in deficit, to the country in surplus. As productive capacity
in the country in deficit rises from its existing level the
quota will be reduced proportionately until the quota equals
zero.
This rule accentuated the need for retaliatory restriction by surplus
states: applied by a deficit country in the limiting case where exports
and imports of a given good are equal, for example, it would abso-
lutely prohibit merchandise inflow while leaving the affected indus-
try of the trading partner completely unprotected from foreign com-
petition. It would perhaps be better to set an initial quota at the cur-
rent import level less domestic excess capacity and then through time
reduce permitted inflow by amounts equal to the difference between-
capacity increases and demand expansions. The formula of paragraph
6 anticipated immediate substitution of domestic goods for imported
goods in each country. Reciprocal trade in a given product category,
however, implies national specialization within that category or a
pattern of transportation costs such that supply of some areas of each
country by foreign firms is most efficient. In either case the advan-
tages of exchange would seem worth preserving. Hazlewood com-
ments: "This was a formula for bringing interterritorial trade to an
end. . . . If rigidly applied it would prevent territorial specializa-
tion and would compel the uneconomic production of all varieties
of a broad product line in each territory. . . .It would have been odd
to tackle the problem of imbalance in trade by the elimination of
trade." 78
78. Haziewood, Ecownmic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION
AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 69,
97 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967). There is evidence that the inadequacies of this
system were recognized in at least some drafts of the revised Agreement:
"The existence of the anomaly ... in the original formulation of the quota
system was recognized and corrected in the revised Agreement of Mbale at
the beginning of 1965. It was agreed that the minimum quota should allow
the surplus country to export to the deficit country as much as she im-
ported from the deficit country." Id. at 98.
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The system of restrictions was to be controlled by a Comnittee of
the Ministers of Commerce and Industry of Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda. This body was to be aided in its deliberations by recommen-
dations of a subordinate Quota Committee, composed of the union
Commissioner for Customs and Excise; two officials representing the
Secretariat and the Economic Advisory Unit of the East African Com-
mon Services Organization; and four officials from each country rep-
resenting national departments of Commerce, Industry, Finance, and
Planning. A state desiring consideration of trade limitation proposals
could in absence of objection convene the latter Committee on at least
two weeks notice; either partner, however, might defer assembly by
an additional two weeks. Ministerial unanimity was presumably re-
quired for quota imposition.
Article 10 of the original Agreement manifested realization on the
part of the negotiators that the quota system might actually have
discriminated against goods produced within the union with respect
to merchandise purchased from third countries:
In certain cases. . . there may be no opportunity for an East
African country in surplus to compete against imports from
outside East Africa in a particular product line where a
zero quota is imposed. The deficit country is therefore per-
mitted to substitute first for imports from other East Afri-
can countries before reducing its imports of the same prod-
uct from outside East Africa.
Means of correction were not suggested. On revision this language
was replaced by an expression of willingness "to take external trade
factors into account when calculating the size of quotas so long as
this does not cause delays."
E. OTHER PROVISIONS
The desire expressed in section (e) of article 1 was reasserted with-
out significant elaboration of implementation procedures in articles 5
and 12. The former provision contained little more than a statement
that "deficit countries would increase their sales and surplus coun-
tries would increase their imports from deficit countries as quickly as
possible." The latter blandly reiterated: "As regards the possibility of
surplus countries making greater purchases from deficit countries,
it was agreed that this should be pursued." An import promotion
drive by Kenya appears anticipated.
Article 6 and Appendix 2 evidenced a desire to expand the already
important controls over plant location established in article 2 as
rapidly as studies permitting rational regulation could be completed.
A Committee of Industrial Experts was to be created and charged
with:
(a) developing and evaluating lists of "East African Indus-
tries" in accordance with the following definitions:-
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(i) An "East African Industry" is one which is
economically feasible only if it has access to
the entire market of East Africa.
(ii) An "East African Industry" is one which is
economically feasible only if it has access to
a market larger than that of any one coun-
try in East Africa.
(b) examining the basis for distribution of these industries,
giving particular regard:-
(i) to economic feasibility;
(ii) to the need for an equitable distribution of in-
dustry;
(iii) to advising on measures for achieving rapidly
an equitable pattern of industrial location.
The standard of (a) (i) would appear to add little to the test set forth
in (a) (ii).
Much of the Agreement consisted of emergency measures calculated
to preserve at least a framework of economic union while dramatically
deviating from common market principles in an attempt to confer
,on the disadvantaged member states short-term benefits sufficient to
assure their continued participation. Appendix 3 evidenced the con-
ditional nature of assent to sacrifice obtained from Kenyan nego-
tiators:
The Kenya delegation, in agreeing to the recommendations of
this Report, has assumed that:-
(a) the East African Common Market will continue;
(b) the common services will continue;
(c) in particular there will continue to be a common cur-
rency;
(d) all parties recognize the value of association in a com-
mon market in fostering the economic development of
the whole area;
(e) all parties agreed that the Common Market can only
survive if the benefits of this economic development
are shared between them.79
VI. THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN CO-OPERATION
A. FORMULATION
Conclusion of the Kampala Agreement spurred hope of increasing
unity in spite of its distorting restrictions: "With the unfolding of
more . . such cooperative efforts, it may be that the answer to the
perplexing question of which comes first-political union or economic
cooperation-will be found. It appears at the moment that an economic
hen may yet hatch a political egg, the Federation." so Nevertheless,
79. See Organise or Disintegrate, E. AFR. TRADE & INDus., Dec. 1963, at 11.
:80. E.A. Federation-What Chances Now?, E. AFR. J., Aug. 1964, at 25, 26.
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although some early progress in implementing the provisions for in-
dustry allocation was reported,8 1 the arrangement was not ratified by
the partner states.
In the spring of 1965 Tanzania unilaterally decided to establish a
national currency and a central bank system, forcing similar actions
by Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania also imposed quotas limiting im-
port from partner states of a wide range of products,82 apparently
hoping to compel exporting Kenyan firms to establish local factories."
Although domination by Kenya of trade in manufactures was less
striking than in earlier years, 84 disintegration continued: "[T] he sig-
natories of the Kampala Agreement succeeded in achieving the worst
of possible worlds-interterritorial trade imbalances being corrected
by curtailment of trade and a diminished rate of regional indus-
trialization." 85 The Kenyan Minister of Finance voiced fear that
"if things go the way they are going now, it only means we are go-
ing to break up everything-the Common Services, the railways, tele-
commnunications, everything." 86
81. Q. EcoN. REV. -E. AFR., April 1965, at 3.
82. Entry was restricted with respect to soap and detergents, insecticides, knit-
wear, underwear, beer, galvanized iron, nails, paint, exercise books, wheat
flour, biscuits, sugar, and confectionary. Id.; Hazlewood, Economic Integra-
tion in East Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DIsINTGRATION-CASE
STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 69, 109 (A. Hazlewood ed.
1967).
83. As the months went by without ratification Tanzania felt she had no
option but to take action on her own, though in accordance with the
principles agreed in Kampala. It therefore decided to impose tem-
porary quotas on certain Kenya imports with the sole object of pro-
moting their production in Tanzania. This was an indication that
Tanzania was taking only the very minimum action and then only
when it became imperative for her own development. President
Nyerere said that it was important to realize that even if the quotas
cut imports from Kenya as much as 2 million pounds sterling an-
nually, which was unlikely, Tanzania would still be the largest na-
tional importer of Kenya goods.
The Financial Times, Aug. 11, 1965, quoted in Wionczek, Economic Inte-
gration and Regional Distribution of Industrial Activities: A Comparative
Study (Part II: East Africa), 4 E. AFR. ECON. REv. 31, 35 (1967). See
Q. EcoN. REv.-E. AFR., Oct. 1965, at 1-2.
84. An index may be derived by dividing intramarket exports of manufactures
by each state by its imports of the manufactures of its partners:
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
1959 6.37 0.08 0.39
1961 5.81 0.06 0.50
1963 4.41 0.17 0.46
1965 3.49 0.27 0.49
1966 2.91 0.23 0.67
Roe, The Reshaping of East African Economic Co-operation (pt. 1), E.
AFR. J., Aug. 1967, at 11, 15, Table 3.
85. Wionczek, Economic Integration and Regional Distribution of Industrial
Activities: A Comparative Study (Part II: East Africa), 4 E. AFR. ECON.
REv. 31, 37 (1967).
86. Quoted in Hazlewood, Economic Integration in East Africa, in AFRICAN IN-
TEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION-CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
UNION 69, 106 (A. Hazlewood ed. 1967).
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Threat of dissolution led to the formation of the Commission on
East African Co-operation, composed of three ministers from each
partner state and an independent chairman, Kjeld Philip of Denmark.
The report of this Commission, submitted in mid-1966, formed the
basis of the Treaty for East African Co-operation. This agreement,
signed at Kampala on June 6, 1967, entered into force the following
December 1.87
B. ORGANIZATION
The Treaty unites Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, termed the Part-
ner States, to form an East African Community. Article 2 declares
the purpose of the Community to be "to strengthen and regulate the
industrial, commercial and other relations of the Partner States to
the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced de-
velopment and sustained expansion of economic activities the benefits
whereof shall be equitably shared." 88 The Treaty provides an elabo-
rate framework for cooperation without sacrifice of sovereignty.
The principal executive powers of the Community are vested in the
East African Authority, comprising the Presidents of the three con-
stituent states. Substantial responsibilities are entrusted to three East
African Ministers, each an officer of cabinet rank nominated by one
of the contracting parties. Action by either body can be vetoed by any
of its members. The East African Ministers form the nuclei of Com-
mon Market, Communications, Economic Consultation and Planning,
Finance, and Research and Social Councils. The Common Market
Council and a Common Market Tribunal consisting of a Chairman.
and four other members appointed by the Authority are charged with
87. See id. at 114. The Treaty has been printed on behalf of the East African
Common Services Organization by the Government Printer, Nairobi, Kenya.
88. The same article enumerates more detailed goals:
(a) the establishment and maintenance, subject to certain excep-
tions, of a common customs tariff and a common excise tariff;
(b) the abolition generally of restrictions on trade between Partner
States;
(c) the inauguration, in the long term, of a common agricultural pol-
icy;
(d) the establishment of an East African Development Bank ...
(e) the retention of freedom of current account payments between
the Partner States, and freedom of capital account payments
necessary to further the aims of the Community;
(f) the harmonization, required for the proper functioning of the
Common Market, of the monetary policies of the Partner States
and in particular consultation in case of any disequilibrium in
the balances of payments of the Partner States;
(g) the operation of services common to the Partner States;
(h) the co-ordination of economic planning;
(i) the co-ordination of transport policy;
(j) the approximation of the commercial laws of the Partner States;
and
(k) such other activities, calculated to further the aims of the Com-
munity, as the Partner States may from time to time decide
to undertake in common.
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policing the integration program and resolving disputes concerning
its operation among the Partner States. The large self-contained com-
munications and transportation services are reorganized as Corpo-
rations within the Community, controlled by the Authority and sub-
ject to general supervision by the Communications Council. The Com-
munity is also to administer the other joint services.2 Functions of
the other Councils are essentially advisory. Three Deputy East Afri-
can Ministers may also be appointed. The permanent staff of the Com-
munity is headed by a Secretary General selected by the Authority;
the Counsel to the Community, similarly chosen, is second in com-
mand.
The Treaty directs establishment of an East African Legislative
Assembly, composed of a Chairman appointed by the Authority, the
two ranking officials of the Community staff, the East African Min-
isters and Deputy Ministers, and nine additional members appointed
by each Partner State. Enactment of Community measures requires
approval by a majority of the members of the Assembly present and
voting and assent by the Presidents of the three countries. Neither
the Chairman of the Assembly nor the staff representatives are en-
titled to vote. Annex X gives the Tribunal legislative competence with
respect to enumerated aspects of the institutions of the Community
and the joint services which they administer. It may in addition take
action concerning "[a]ny matter . . .which is incidental to the ex-
ecution, performance or enforcement of any function conferred by
this Treaty or by an Act of the Community upon any institution or
authority, or officer in the service, of the Community. or upon any
authority or servant of a Corporation." Community headquarters is
established at Arusha, Tanzania; administrative centers within the
Community, such as those of the Corporations, are distributed among
the participating states.
C. TRANSFER TAXES
Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty generally prohibit either tariffs
or quantitative restrictions on trade among the Partner States. Har-
monization of industrial development incentive plans is anticipated by
article 19. Article 67 directs that the revenue pool established by the
East African Common Services Organization Agreement of Decem-
ber 9, 1961,0 to compensate Tanzania and Uganda for deficits in their
trade with Kenya be halved shortly after entry into force of the
Treaty and liquidated perhaps as early as the middle of 1969.
Relief is given by an exception to article 11, introduced in section
1 of article 20 as "a measure to promote new industrial develop-
ment in those Partner States which are less developed industrially
. . . ." Section 3 provides: "[A] Partner State which is in deficit in
its total trade in manufactured goods with the other two Partner
89. See note 26 supra.
90. See § IV(C) 8upra-
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States may impose transfer taxes upon manufactured goods which
are transferred to that State and briginate from either of the other
Partner States." Those categories of products considered "manufac-
tured goods" are set forth in Annex IV. The list may be amended by
the Authority.
Under section 4 the tax may be imposed only on "goods of a value
not exceeding the amount of the deficit in trade in manufactured
goods between the State which is imposing the transfer tax and the
State of origin of the goods upon which the tax is to be imposed."
In addition section 7 provides:
A Partner State may impose a transfer tax upon a partic-
ular kind of manufactured goods only if at the time the tax
is imposed, or within three months thereafter if the tax is
imposed in the reasonable expectation that the manufacture
of such goods will commence within three months, the indus-
try within the tax imposing State has the capacity to produce
in the ensuing year:-
(a) a quantity of goods equivalent to not less than 15 per
cent of the domestic consumption within that Partner
State of goods of that particular kind in the period of
twelve months immediately preceding the imposition
of the tax; or
(b) goods of that particular kind having an ex-factory
value of not less than 2,000,000 shillings.
The magnitude of the tax is controlled by section 8:
The rate of transfer tax shall be determined by the Partner
State which imposes it, but the rate for a particular item
shall not exceed:-
(a) where the duty is chargeable ad valorem or ad valorem
as an alternative to the specific duty, 50 per cent of
the rate of duty prescribed by the customs tariff of
the tax imposing State in respect of the import of the
same kind of item; or
(b) where the duty is a specific duty with no alternative ad
valorenz, 50 per cent of the ad valorenz equivalent of
the specific duty;
but if the same kind of item is not chargeable with any duty
on import no transfer tax may be imposed.
Computation of the value of goods subject to the tax is controlled by
Annex V.
Sections 14 and 15 provide for expiration of a transfer tax eight
years after its imposition and revocation of all such taxes 15 years
after entry into force of the Treaty. A means of adjustment for
changed conditions is established in section 20:
If a transfer tax is imposed by a Partner State upon a par-
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ticular kind of manufactured goods originating in the other
Partner States, or one of them, and subsequently not less
than 30 per cent of the total ex-factory value of sales, in any
period of twelve months, of manufactured goods of that kind
originating in the tax imposing State is sold for transfer to
the other Partner States or to a foreign country, a Partner
State may, if it considers that in the circumstances the tax
ought not to continue in force, having regard to all relevant
matters and to this Treaty, raise the matter within the Com-
mon Market Council and the Council may direct that the
Partner State which imposed the tax shall revoke it.
Section 22 authorized the Council in exceptional circumstances to pro-
hibit imposition of transfer taxes on goods the manufacture of which
is regulated under the program introduced by the East African In-
dustrial Licensing Ordinance of 1953.11 Section 23 extends the present
licensing system until 1973. New licenses may be granted, although
no additional articles are to be scheduled. Early revision of the sys-
tem through action by the East African Legislative Assembly is an-
ticipated.
Adjustment through transfer taxes not only allows immediate pay-
ment of at least partial compensation to states suffering deficits in
intramarket trade, but also encourages balanced industrialization by
permitting protection of entrepreneurs locating in less advanced mem-
ber states from external competition. Although it places less reliance
on market forces, the program has much in common with a plai, for
an "area of balanced free trade" recently introduced by Elkan.":' Ie
suggests grouping of exchangeable goods in several categories,":' argu-
ing: "Between most countries an increase in 'complementary' trade
specialisation appears prima facie undesirable. On the other hand...
an increase in 'competitive' trade specialisation, that is, in the inter-
national exchange of goods belonging to the same broad class, is
91. See § IV(B) supra.
92. Elkan, Blueprint for an Area of Quantitatively and Structurally Balanced
Free Trade, 5 J. COMMON MARKET STUDIES 1 (1966); Elkan, How To Beat
Backwash: The Case for Customs-Drawback Unions, 75 ECON. J. 44 (1965).
93. Those established by Kojima are used for purposes of illustration:
I. Staple foods (rice, wheat and other grains).
II. Other foodstuffs, including manufactured foods.
III. Agricultural raw materials.
IV. Minerals, metals and fuels.
V. Labour-intensive goods of light industry, both intermediate and
final products.
VI. Labour-intensive final goods of heavy and chemical industry
origin (cameras, sewing machines, etc.).
VII. Capital-intensive intermediate goods of heavy and chemical in-
dustry origin (pig-iron, steel, chemical fibre, fertilizer, etc.).
VIII. Capital-intensive heavy machines and equipment.
Kojima, The Pattern of Triangular Trade Among the U.S.A., Japan, and
Southeast Asia, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Mar.-Aug. 1962, at 48.
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practically always highly desirable." 91 He therefore urges pairs of
integrating states to permit unimpeded entry of commodities in each
classification to the extent that potential group import duties from
the exchange partner are balanced by potential group export duties
to it; normal tariff rates would be applied to imports unbalanced by
reciprocal exports.
Under the plan, two documents would be issued to an importer of
goods from a partner state. One of these, termed an "assessment for
deferred duty of intra-area imports," would represent an obligation
on the part of the importer to pay within 90 days to the state into
which the goods were imported a duty equal to its face value. The
other, a "certificate of intra-area imports" with a face value of 110
per cent of the duty, could be freely exchanged by the importer. An
importer could cancel his obligation to pay duty by presenting to the
customs office before the expiration of the 90-day period his assess-
ment certificate together with another state's intra-area imports cer-
tificate of matching face value and relating to the same product
category. Uncompensated trade flows would thus be restricted to a
maximum of 10 per cent of exports of the disadvantaged state in
any product category.95 After initial agreement unification would pro-
ceed largely without additional government intervention, although
progress would perhaps be less rapid than would be possible under
other programs 6 The East African plan sacrifices automatic adjust-
94. Elkan, How To Beat Backwash: The Case for Custoin-Drawback Unions,
75 ECON. J. 44, 52 (1965).
95. To assure smooth functioning of the system Elkan would impose the fol-
lowing conditions:
(1) Certificates would be valid for 120 days, one month longer than
Assessments.
(2) Certificates would be negotiable and would be expected to pass
from the importers to whom they had been issued into the hands
of importers in the other member countries who would then use
them to cancel their Assessments. This transfer could take place
privately, either through direct contact or through intermediaries,
and at any price agreed on by the parties.
(3) Any Certificates not utilized within 90 days from their date of
issue would have to be offered for sale to the highest bidder
through an officially authorized broker.
Elkan, Blueprint for an Area of Quantitatively and Structurally Balanced
Free Trade, 5 J. ComMMoN AARKuT STUDIES 1, 4 (1966).
96. Elkan concludes:
The principle underlying an area of balanced free trade . .. could
provide a measure of common ground to freetraders and protection-
ists. It . . . would secure approximate quantitative and structural
balance in the mutual duty-free trade of its members by means of a
nondiscriminatory legal and institutional framework, within which
actual decisions about the use of resources in production and trade
would be taken by autonomous firms; the idea could therefore also
become the basis of constructive agreement between those advocates
of economic integration who emphasize the allocative role of markets
and the beneficial effects of competition, and those who stress balance
of payments considerations, the importance of the economies of scale
19691
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:2
ment to achieve more direct control over the development process by
the states involved.
D. THE EAST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Article 21 of the Treaty provides for establishment of an East Afri-
can Development Bank. The charter of this new institution comprises
Annex VI. Article 1 of this Annex sets forth the objectives of the
Bank:
(a) to provide financial and technical assistance to promote
the industrial development of the Partner States;
(b) to give priority . . . to industrial development in the
relatively less industrially developed Partner States,
thereby endeavouring to reduce the substantial indus-
trial imbalances between them;
(c) to further the aims of the East African Community by
financing, wherever possible, projects designed to
make the economies of the Partner States increas-
ingly complementary in the industrial field;
(d) to supplement the activities of the national develop-
ment agencies of the Partner States by joint financ-
ing operations and by the use of such agencies as
channels for financing specific projects;
(e) to co-operate . . . with other institutions and organiza-
tions, public or private, national or international,
which are interested in the industrial development of
the Partner States; and
(f) to undertake such other activities and provide such
other services as may advance the objectives of the
Bank.
The second of these aims indicates an intention to use the institu-
tion as an equilibrating mechanism.
Membership in the Bank is open not only to the sponsoring states
but also to "bodies corporate, enterprises or institutions" approved
by the Authority. Authorized capital is approximately 60 million
dollars; the initial subscription of each Partner State is set at about
12 million dollars, scheduled to be paid in four installments over a
period of 18 months after the Treaty enters into force. Payments
other than the first may be deferred if the funds are not needed im-
mediately. Contributions of other members, to be fixed by the Bank,
may not exceed 49 per cent of total capital. Additional Special Funds
may be accepted.
and the responsibility of governments for shaping the industrial
structure of their countries. Finally, the proposal takes into account
the important observation that without firm commitment to some kind
of automatic procedure progress towards integration is likely to be
very slow, uneven and uncertain.
Id. at 10.
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All powers of the Bank are vested in a Board of Directors com-
posed of one member appointed by each Partner State and up to two
members elected by other participants. The Bank staff is headed by a
Director-General, appointed by the Authority, who presides at meet-
ings of the Board of Directors but may not vote. Action requires ap-
proval by a majority of the total voting power, which is distributed
among the Board members in proportion to the capital contributed
by the interests they represent. The Bank is to possess full juridical
personality: it may contract, acquire and dispose of real and personal
property, and institute legal proceedings. Charter amendments re-
quire support of 85 per cent of the total voting power and approval
by the -Authority.
Article 10 provides:
[T] he Bank may provide finances or facilitate financing in
any of the following ways to any agency, entity or enter-
prise operating in the territories of the Partner States--
(a) by making or participating in direct loans with its
[own funds] ;
(b) by making or participating in direct loans with funds
raised by the Bank in capital markets or borrowed or
otherwise acquired by the Bank for inclusion in its
ordinary capital resources;
(c) by investment of funds referred to in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this Article in the equity capital of an in-
stitution or enterprise; or
(d) by guaranteeing, in whole or in part, loans made by
others for industrial development.
Financial assistance may thus be granted both to public and to pri-
vate enterprise. Under article 11, however, "[t]he total amount out-
standing of loans, equity investments and guarantees made by the
Bank in its ordinary operations shall not at any time exceed one and
a half times the total amount of its unimpaired subscribed capital,
reserves and surplus . . . available for ordinary operations." 'More-
over neither equity investment nor guarantees may exceed 10 per
cent of its own available funds.
The objective of balanced development is given concrete content
in article 13:
[T] he Bank shall ensure that, taken over consecutive periods
of five years, the first of which shall begin upon the com-
mencement of the operations of the Bank, it shall so conduct
its operations that it shall have loaned, guaranteed or other-
wise invested, as nearly as is possible, in the United Republic
of Tanzania 383 1 per cent of the total sum which it has
loaned, guaranteed or otherwise invested of its ordinary cap-
ital resources and the Special Funds, in the Sovereign State
of Uganda 383'a per cent thereof and in the Republic of
1969]
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Kenya 221/2 per cent thereof . ... [A]fter a period of ten
years from the commencement of operations of the Bank,
the Partner States shall review the percentages specified in
this paragraph and thereafter the Authority, after consulta-
tion with the Board of Directors, may by order published
in the Gazette of the Community alter the percentages
specified ....
Activity will thus be concentrated in the less advanced member states
during the first decade of Bank life.
VII. CONCLUSION
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have been united economically for
more than four decades. Partnership has greatly benefited Kenya.
While Uganda has also profited, Tanzania could perhaps have devel-
oped more swiftly without association. Imbalance within the union
is striking: industry has concentrated in Kenya, the state with the
highest per capita income level and the most rapid rate of growth.
Tanzania and Uganda have purchased protected Kenyan manufac-
tures at prices above world market levels but have had little demand
for their own exports in the markets of their partner. Early efforts
to redress this imbalance through transfer payments under the East
African Common Services Organization Agreement of 1961 proved in-
sufficient. The 1964 Kampala Agreement, an attempt to promote
balance through allocation of industry and introduction of quotas,
could not be implemented. The Treaty for East African Co-operation,
which entered into force on December 1, 1967, replaces these controls
with a system of transfer taxes and an East African Development
Bank charged with promoting balanced growth. The prospect of
economic gain has motivated continuing association in spite of the
difficulty of assuring equitable distribution of this gain among the
participating states.
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